題目：Does External Monitoring From The Government Improve The Performance Of State-Owned Enterprises

摘要：In this paper we investigate the impact of external monitoring from the government on state-owned enterprise performance, using the variation in monitoring strength arising from a nationwide policy change and firms’ geographic location in China. We utilise a structural approach to estimate input prices and productivity separately at the firm level using commonly available production data. We show that enhanced external monitoring, as a key component of corporate governance, can substantially reduce managerial expropriation in procurement (proxied by input prices) and shirking in production management (proxied by productivity). The results suggest that government monitoring can be an effective policy instrument to improve state-owned enterprise performance.

鏈接：https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueab048

研究問(wèn)題: In this paper we empirically examine the role of external monitoring from the government in SOE performance.

研究動(dòng)機(jī)：While previous work analysing the performance of SOEs emphasises internal incentivisation (e.g., Groves et al., 1994; Li, 1997; Konings et al., 2005; Brown et al., 2006; Estrin et al., 2009; Chen et al., forthcoming), the impact of external monitoring has been largely ignored.

研究設(shè)計(jì)：In this paper we utilise the variation in the strength of government monitoring arising from the nationwide policy change and firms’ geographic location to investigate the impact of external monitoring on SOE performance in input prices and productivity, using a difference-in-differences style analysis.

研究貢獻(xiàn)：

（1）our paper identifies external monitoring from government as a new and important driving force of SOE performance in affecting managerial expropriation in?procurement and shirking in production management?

（2）By focusing on external monitoring, this paper contributes to the literature on the performance of SOEs, which documents significant gaps between Chinese state-owned and private manufacturing firms in profitability, TFP and capital productivity

（3）This paper is also related to the literature on the impact of monitoring/sanction in corporate governance

一篇重要的參考文獻(xiàn)：Huang, Z., Li, L., Ma, G. and Xu, L.C. (2017). ?Hayek, local? information, and commanding heights: Decentralizing state-owned enterprises in China?, American Economic Review, vol. 107(8), pp. 2455?78.